Harden admin deployment and local acceptance
Enforce mTLS and least-privilege runtime boundaries while adding repeatable MySQL 8.4 and Docker smoke checks that require no production secrets.
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@@ -31,6 +31,14 @@ server {
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ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3;
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ssl_session_timeout 1d;
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ssl_session_cache shared:account_tls:10m;
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# Request client certificates at the shared TLS edge without requiring them
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# for mobile APIs. Only the dedicated admin CA is trusted for verification.
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ssl_client_certificate /www/server/openresty/conf/mtls/admin-client-ca.pem;
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ssl_verify_client optional;
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ssl_verify_depth 2;
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# An invalid certificate is rejected before location processing; normalize
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# that TLS verification failure so it does not reveal the protected surface.
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error_page 495 =404 @client_certificate_not_found;
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client_max_body_size 21m;
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server_tokens off;
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@@ -39,8 +47,48 @@ server {
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add_header X-Frame-Options "DENY" always;
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add_header Referrer-Policy "no-referrer" always;
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# Never publish operational or administrative paths through this vhost.
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location ~ ^/(?:admin|internal|v1/admin)(?:/|$) {
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# Internal-only endpoints remain unavailable through this public vhost.
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location ~ ^/internal(?:/|$) {
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return 404;
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}
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# Administrative endpoints are indistinguishable from missing routes unless
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# OpenResty verified a certificate issued by the dedicated admin client CA.
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location ~ ^/(?:admin|v1/admin)(?:/|$) {
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if ($ssl_client_verify != SUCCESS) {
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return 404;
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}
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client_max_body_size 32k;
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limit_req zone=account_api burst=40 nodelay;
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# Defining a location-level header disables inheritance from the server
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# block, so repeat the security headers explicitly.
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add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
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add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
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add_header X-Frame-Options "DENY" always;
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add_header Referrer-Policy "no-referrer" always;
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add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; base-uri 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'" always;
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add_header Cache-Control "no-store" always;
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proxy_pass http://osg_account_server;
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proxy_http_version 1.1;
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proxy_set_header Host $host;
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proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto https;
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proxy_set_header X-Request-ID $request_id;
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# Overwrite any client-supplied value; Ktor must trust only this header.
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proxy_set_header X-OSG-mTLS-Verified "SUCCESS";
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proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
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proxy_set_header Connection $connection_upgrade;
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proxy_hide_header Server;
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proxy_request_buffering off;
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proxy_buffering off;
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proxy_cache off;
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proxy_read_timeout 360s;
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proxy_send_timeout 360s;
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}
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location @client_certificate_not_found {
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return 404;
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}
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@@ -53,6 +101,8 @@ server {
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
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proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto https;
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proxy_set_header X-Request-ID $request_id;
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# Suppress spoofed trust signals on every non-admin request.
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proxy_set_header X-OSG-mTLS-Verified "";
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proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
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proxy_set_header Connection $connection_upgrade;
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proxy_hide_header Server;
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